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THE PURCHASER-SELLER LIMITATION
TO SEC RULE 10b-5
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and Securi-
ties Exchange and Commission Rule l0b-52 provide a private cause of
action to persons who have been fraudulently induced to purchase or
sell securities.3 When a corporation is fraudulently induced to issue,
purchase, or sell securities, it has a cause of action under rule lOb-5 that
may be asserted directly by the corporation or derivatively by its share-
holders.4 Early in the development of rule lOb-5 the requirement
emerged that a plaintiff seeking damages resulting from a fraudulent
1 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules -
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in an act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security.
3 The leading case recognizing civil liability under rule lOb-5 is Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), modified, 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.), modi-
fied, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Since Kardon, civil liability under rule lOb-5 has
been upheld by a majority of the circuits of the court of appeals. E.g., Dasho v. Susque-
hanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Janigan v. Taylor,
344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965); Stevens v. 'Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Hooper v.
Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961);
Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d
369 (3d Cir. 1956); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). Civil
liability under rule 10b-5 is implied by the decisions of a number of other circuits. See,
e.g., Boone v. Baugh, 308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v.
Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962).
4 Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967)
(issuance of shares attending a statutory merger subjects transaction to derivative action
under § 10(b)); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961) (issuance of shares in return for allegedly spurious assets ac-
tionable by corporate trustee in bankruptcy); see Comment, Securities Regulation: Share-
holder Derivative Actions Against Insiders Under Rule lOb-5, 1966 Dura L.J. 166; Note,
Shareholders' Derivative Suit To Enforce a Corporate Right of Action Against Directors
Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 114 U. PA. L. Rxv. 578 (1966).
SEC RULE l0b-,5
securities transaction must occupy the position of a purchaser or seller
with regard to that transaction,5 This restriction has been invoked to
deny plaintiffs the benefits6 of a 10b-5 action in a growing number of
cases.
Arguably, because the Supreme Court has endorsed private en-
forcement of the proxy rules under section 14a,7 it would also endorse
similar private enforcement of rule lOb-5. This possibility, together
with the recent marked judicial expansion of the scope of rule lOb-5
makes appropriate the reexamination of the need for the purchaser-
seller limitation.
I
TiH Birnbaum DocrmNE
The purchaser-seller restriction was first imposed upon rule lOb-5
in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.8 Newport's minority shareholders
5 The requirement that a rule lOb-5 plaintiff must be either a purchaser or seller in
the fraudulent transaction should be distinguished from the privity requirement once
thought to exist. Some earlier cases established the rule that a plaintiff claiming a viola-
tion of rule lOb-5 in a transaction to which he was a party had to show that the transac-
tion was negotiated directly or indirectly with the defendant, rather than, for example,
across a national securities exchange. Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99
F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952) (there must be
a "semblance of privity'); see Donovan v. Taylor, 136 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Cal. 1955); 3
L. Loss, SECUITIE.S REGULATION 1767 (2d ed. 1961). More recently the privity requirement
has been relaxed to the point of extinction. Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Freed v. Szabo Food Serv., Inc., 1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH FEn.
SEc. L. REP. 91,317 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
By contrast, the purchaser-seller limitation arises when the defendant claims that the
plaintiff has not transacted in securities at any time contemporaneous with defendant's
alleged fraudulent conduct. The case usually cited as establishing the purchaser-seller
limitation is Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952), discussed at pp. 685-87 infra. But see McManus v. Jessup & Moore Paper
Co., 5 SEC Jud. Dec. 810 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (under allegations similar to those in Birnbaum a
motion to dismiss was denied without opinion).
6 A plaintiff suing under § 10(b) is not required to comply with the security-for-
expenses requirements that some states impose on a person bringing a derivative action.
McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
A plaintiff in federal court by virtue of diversity of citizenship, however, is subject to the
state statute. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Another advantage
in proceeding under the 1934 Act is the availability of its liberal service of process and
venue provisions. Securities Exchange Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
7 The proxy rules are contained in the Securities Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(a) (1964), and SEC rules promulgated thereunder. The Supreme Court has stated:
Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to Com-
mission action. As in antitrust treble damage litigation, the possibility of civil
damages or injunctive relief serves as a most effective weapon in the enforcement
of the proxy requirements.
JI. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 US. 426, 432 (1964).
8 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
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brought a derivative action under rule lOb-5 against the former con-
trolling shareholder, claiming that he had sold his stock to certain steel
users and received a high premium allegedly paid for the valuable right
to control the distribution of Newport's products during the Korean
War steel shortage. 9 The shareholders sought an accounting for the mis-
appropriated asset. Dismissing the action, the court viewed rule lob-5 as
extending "protection only to the defrauded purchaser or seller."'1 The
corporation, not a party to the actual sale of control, failed to qualify.'1
The court further interpreted rule 1Ob-5 as having no relation to
"fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs."' 2 The case therefore
has a dual aspect. It has been cited as authority for the distinct but re-
lated propositions that the rule does not permit redress of breaches of
fiduciary duty,13 and that an action under the rule is not available to a
party who is neither a purchaser nor a seller.14 The Second Circuit's
9 The complaint also charged defendants with misrepresentations and nondisclosures
in the announcement of the rejection of a proposed profitable merger of Newport, and in
reporting the sale of stock. Id. at 462.
10 193 F.2d at 464.
11 This limitation was highlighted when the same plaintiffs were later able to bring
their action in federal court using diversity of citizenship as the jurisdictional base. The
Second Circuit, in Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955), applied the substantive law of Indiana to permit plaintiffs to recover the control
premium from the selling shareholder. Although the action was derivative, the court di-
rected that any recovery should go only to the shareholders who did not participate in
the sale of control. Id. at 178. The case was finally settled, and plaintiffs' counsel fees
and disbursements were awarded from the settlement. Perlman v. Feldmann, 160 F. Supp.
310 (D. Conn. 1958). The case has received a good deal of criticism. E.g., 40 CORNELL L.Q.
786 (1955), 71 HARv. L. REv. 1559 (1959), 68 HARv. L. Rav. 1274 (1955).
12 193 F.2d at 464.
13 E.g., O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1964) (acts of waste by manage-
ment not actionable where no deception was alleged); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F.
Supp. 385, 395-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (purchase of stock from corporation by controlling share-
holder only gave rise to breach of fiduciary duty where all parties knew all material facts).
But cf. Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), in which the court
stated: "that the fraud was perpetrated by insiders does not render Section 10(b) inappli-
cable, if the transaction represents an abuse of the securities trading process, and should
properly be subject to SEC regulations for an adequate remedy." Id. at 25 (emphasis
added).
14 Pacific Ins. Co. v. Blot, 267 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (plaintiff barred from
seeking an injunction against party who was attempting to compel disclosure of share-
holder records through use of shares alleged to have been fraudulently acquired); Stude-
baker Corp. v. Allied Prods. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich. 1966), appeal dismissed,
New York Times, Dec. 31, 1966, at 27, col. 3 (corporation denied standing to enjoin manip-
ulation of its stock); Chashin v. Mencher, 255 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (plaintiff unable
to show she was a defrauded seller since her sale occurred prior to alleged misconduct);
Defiance Industries, Inc. v. Galdi, 256 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (corporation has no
standing to recover damages for stock manipulations that allegedly caused its share-
holders to sell at depressed prices); Keers & Co. v. American Steel & Pump Corp., 234 F.
Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (no damage action allowed where sale of controlling block of
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primary concern may have been that application of rule lOb-5 to a
breach of fiduciary duty-as distinguished from the type of fraudulent
practice "usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities"' 5-
would call into being federal rights not required by the objectives of
the securities legislation. The decision may therefore by viewed as an
avoidance of a field traditionally reserved to the states. This interpreta-
tion gains strength from the plain language of the rule, which does not
seem to impose a purchaser-seller requirement. 6
The language of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act con-
demns "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors."'17 Under this phrase, the Commission presumably
could adopt rules specifically encompassing the Birnbaum situation.' 8
Alternatively, courts might allow an action by a non-purchaser or a
non-seller under the present rule. Broadly speaking, rule lOb-5 pro-
hibits fraudulent schemes, false or misleading statements of material
facts, and fraudulent or deceitful practices "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security."' 9 Arguably, a private remedy should
be available to any person harmed, provided only that there has been
a purchase or sale of securities at some time in connection with the
allegedly fraudulent activity. Whether such person was a party to the
transaction need not be determinative.
Judicial acceptance of this argument would require repudiation
of Birnbaum, and no federal circuit court appears to have gone this far.
At least one district judge, however, believes that Birnbaum has been
overruled,20 and the Second Circuit itself has greatly weakened the
effect of Birnbaum in injunction cases. 21 Two recent decisions side-
stepped the limitation by enlarging the categories of "purchaser" and
"seller" of securities. 22
stock was allegedly made in violation of promise to include minority plaintiffs); New
Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (dictum).
15 193 F.2d at 464.
16 See Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 725, 832-35
(1956).
17 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964) (emphasis added), quoted fully in note
I supra.
18 3 L. Loss, ScusiTms REGULATION 1469 n.87 (2d ed. 1961).
19 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967), quoted in note 2 supra.
20 See Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), discussed at pp. 691-93 infra.
21 See Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967), discussed at
pp. 696-97 infra.
22 In many lob-5 cases plaintiffs assert grounds for relief other than violation of
1968]
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II
EXPANSION OF THE "SELLER" CONCEPT-Vine AND Dasho
In Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co.,28 a minority shareholder of
Crown Finance Company alleged that Beneficial, acting in concert with
Crown's officers, fraudulently caused the merger of Crown into Bene-
ficial for an inadequate consideration. Beneficial allegedly accomplished
the acquisition by obtaining ninety-five percent of the outstanding
Crown stock in a tender offer and then effecting a short merger of
Crown into a Beneficial subsidiary.24 The plaintiff, who refused to sur-
render his shares, claimed that the transactions violated rule lob-5 and
demanded extensive damages for Crown and all those stockholders who
had not sold. The district court dismissed the action on the narrow
ground that, since Vine neither accepted the offer to purchase his stock
nor surrendered his stock pursuant to the statutory short-form merger,
he was not a "seller" of securities and thus could not invoke rule l0b-5.25
On appeal the Second Circuit addressed itself specifically to
whether Vine was a seller. The court noted that the applicable corpora-
tion law gave the shareholders who did not agree to the merger an
opportunity to obtain the fair value of their shares, either by agreement
with the parent corporation or by an appraisal proceeding. The court
held for the plaintiff, stating:
Since, in order to realize any value for his stock, appellant must
exchange the shares for money from appellee, as a practical matter
appellant must eventually become a party to a "sale," as that term
has always been used .... It is true that appellant still has his
stock; if he turned it in for the price of $3.29 a share, it would be
dearer that appellant is a seller. Assuming that this would not other-
wise affect his right to sue under the Act and the Rule, requiring
him to do so as a condition to suit seems a needless formality.20
Defendant had pressed the further argument that, since any decep-
tion related only to those shareholders who tendered their stock,
rule lOb-5. Reference to such other causes of action will not be made unless necessary to
the discussion.
23 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
24 Where a short-form merger statute is in effect, a corporation that owns 90-95%
of the outstanding shares of each class of stock of another corporation may merge the
subsidiary corporation into itself without the approval of the former's shareholders.
Whether the merger had been carried out under Delaware or New York law was unclear.
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 905(a) (McKinney 1963, Supp. 1967) requires 95% ownership. Dr.
CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (Supp. 1966), requires only 90% ownership.
25 252 F. Supp. 212, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
26 874 F.2d at 634 (citations omitted).
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plaintiff could not be considered a defrauded seller. Recognizing that
there might be a requirement of reliance in other situations,2 7 the court
held that it was unnecessary
when no volitional act is required and the result of a forced sale
is exactly that intended by the wrongdoer.... What must be shown
is that there was deception which misled Class A stockholders and
that this was in fact the cause of plaintiff's claimed injury.28
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as amicus curiae, suggested
an alternative basis for the decision- that the plaintiff need not even
have been a selling shareholder so long as there was conduct condemned
by the rule and the plaintiff's stock lost value as a result.29 The court
expressly declined to reach this point, basing its decision on the nar-
rower ground that plaintiff, by virtue of the position defendants placed
him in, was a "seller" of securities.
The court distinguished Vine's position-that of a shareholder
without a corporation-from that of a shareholder who refuses to accept
a fraudulent offer to purchase, but remains a shareholder in an existing
corporation.30 This casts doubt on the position recently taken by a
district court judge that Vine has practically overruled Birnbaum.3'
Vine does, however, demonstrate a judicial propensity to expand the
permissible scope of damage actions under rule lOb-5, when necessary to
achieve a result that accords with the broad policy behind the rule,
i.e., protection of the investing public.
This tendency was again exhibited in Dasho v. Susquehanna
Corp.,32 a derivative suit in which the Seventh Circuit held that a cor-
poration fraudulently induced to issue its own shares in a merger, and
27 See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.s. 811 (1965).
28 374 F.2d at 635. Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D.
Del. 1965), involved a virtually identical situation. A short-form merger was challenged
by a plaintiff who had neither sold her stock nor fully prosecuted an appraisal pro-
ceeding. The court found that a "sale" includes a "contract to sell" under § 8(a)(14) of
the 1934 Act, 48 Stat. 884 (1984), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1964), and that under Delaware
law when plaintiff initially purchased her shares she agreed to surrender them in event
of a merger. The reliance element was supplied by plaintiff's belief in the honesty and
fair dealing of the insiders when she bought her stock. The court found an element of
deception, noting that plaintiff's initial belief in the insiders' honesty was undercut by the
fraudulent terms of the merger. Although both courts reached the same result, the ra-
tionale employed in Vine is decidedly more credible.
29 874 Fd at 686.
80 Id. at 634.
91 See Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), discussed at pp. 691-93 infra.
32 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), tert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
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in turn to receive the shares of another corporation, was effectively
both a "seller" and a "purchaser" for purposes of rule lOb-5. The case
is significant, not so much for the manner in which the court satisfied
the purchaser-seller requirement,33 but for the substantial resemblance
between the transactions involved and the scheme undertaken by the
defendant in Birnbaum. Like Birnbaum, Dasho involved a transfer of
control, allegedly for an excessive premium. In contrast to Birnbaum,
however, the defendant directors in Dasho sold their stock to a corpora-
tion about to merge with their own. The purchasing corporation fi-
nanced the transaction with borrowed funds. The sale was accompanied
by a substitution of directors and allegedly false and misleading state-
ments. Upon consummation of the merger, the liability created for the
stock purchase inured to the surviving corporation. In other words,
the defendants in Dasho sold their shares indirectly to their own
corporation, allegedly for a substantial premium, whereas in Birnbaum
the premium was paid by outside purchasers. In both cases there was
a misappropriation of a corporate asset by the departing directors, but
in Dasho the action was allowed to proceed because the corporation had
been a party to the various exchanges of stock. By dictum the court
accepted the theory that the complex nature of a merger resulted in
greater possibilities for fraud and thus increased the need for protection
of the investing public.34 Though Vine and Dasho have not done away
with the requirement that a lOb-5 plaintiff must be able to show
either purchaser or seller status, the cases do demonstrate a judicial
willingness to turn a more sympathetic ear toward plaintiffs who can
achieve the status of a "constructive seller."35 Moreover, Dasho may
indicate that the more complex the allegedly fraudulent securities
transaction, the more intense will be the judicial scrutiny.
3The idea that the exchange of shares attending a statutory merger could constitute
the surviving corporation both a "purchaser" and a "seller" does not seem particularly
novel in view of such earlier cases as Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964),
and Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 814 (1961), which had held that the issuance by a corporation of its own shares is a
"sale" for purposes of rule lOb-5. See also Simon v. New Haven Board & Carton Co., 250
F. Supp. 297 (D. Conn. 1966) (shareholders entitled to maintain a derivative action on
behalf of a corporation whose acquisition of other corporations for excessive consideration
had allegedly been fraudulently caused). The subject is discussed in greater detail in
36 FoRDAm L. R v. 362 (1967).
84 380 F.2d at 267.
:35 See also Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Il1. 1967), holding that
rule lOb-5 permitted a damage recovery where plaintiffs were parties to intended sales
that were never accomplished because of the alleged fraud of a registered securities repre-
sentative. Plaintiffs were told that securities were being sold for them when in fact they
were not, and in some cases plaintiffs were "sold" nonexistent securities.
[Vol. 53:684
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III
DEMISE OF THE PURCHASER-SELLER LIMITATION IN A
DAMAGE ACToN-Entel v. Allen
The continuing pressure on the courts to expand the reach of rule
lOb-5 will likely force them to venture into the forbidden area carved
out by Birnbaum. There are two basic considerations that are helpful
in evaluating the utility of the purchaser-seller limitation. Procedurally,
the requirement can arise in a direct suit by a private shareholder, in a
direct suit by a corporation, or in a derivative action brought on behalf
of the corporation. The considerations that warrant relaxing the re-
quirement to allow a derivative action or a direct corporate action will
not always apply to the direct individual action. To allow all share-
holders, regardless of purchaser or seller status, access to federal courts
under rule lOb-5 may invite a multitude of suits brought merely for
their nuisance value. The legitimate reluctance of courts to enter the
dismal swamp of intracorporate politics is perhaps well served by the
purchaser-seller limitation. The judiciary will be more inclined, how-
ever, to permit a recovery in a derivative action, because all shareholders
would benefit.
The second consideration concerns the relief sought. Because
Birnbaum was an action for an accounting, it is arguably inapplicable
when an injunction is requested. The desirable objective of policing
securities transactions is most effectively served when an injunction can
be issued to prevent the threatened conduct, and this factor should at
least mitigate the Birnbaum requirement. On the other hand, Birn-
baum poses a much greater osbtacle to a damage action, where the al-
legedly fraudulent conduct has already occurred. The decision in Entel
v. Allen,36 however, purports to lay to rest the purchaser-seller limita-
tion in a damage suit.
The plaintiffs were shareholders of the Atlas Corporation suing
the directors and officers in a direct class action and in a derivative ac-
tion. Atlas, which owned a substantial interest in Northeast Airlines,
entered negotiations for the sale of that interest to Hughes Tool
Company. Plaintiffs claimed that, in obtaining approval of various
stages of the transaction from the Civil Aeronautics Board, the SEC,
and the shareholders of Atlas, the defendants failed to disclose that the
sale was not at arm's length, that the value of Atlas's interest in North-
east was greater than the purchase price, and that Atlas actually received
less than the agreed price.37
36 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
37 Id. at 64.
1968]
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On the first argument, prior to the Vine decision, Judge Bonsal
granted summary judgment for the defendants on the lOb-5 claims.38
Because the plaintiffs in their individual capacities neither bought nor
sold securities, the direct action failed. Although the corporation itself
had sold securities and thereby fulfilled the Birnbaum requirement, the
derivative action likewise failed, because essential allegations that the
corporation had been deceived were lacking. 9 The defendants had
aimed their deception at the shareholders and the government agencies
involved, not at the corporation itself.
Entel came up for reargument shortly after the Second Circuit had
decided Vine and A.T. Brod & Co. v. Berlow.40 In Brod, a stockbroker
alleged that the defendants had ordered securities intending to pay for
them only if their value increased by the settlement date. The lOb-5
claim was dismissed on the ground that the rule protected investors only
from frauds "usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities"
and relating to the investment value of the securities. 41 The Second
Circuit reversed, saying:
We believe that § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 prohibit all fraudulent
schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of securities,
whether the artifices employed involve a garden type variety of
fraud, or present a unique form of deception. Novel or atypical
methods should not provide immunity from the securities laws.42
Judge Bonsai interpreted Vine as all but overruling Birnbaum, so that
there was no longer any obstacle to the direct action, and Brod as suffi-
ciently undercutting the deception requirement of O'Neill v. Maytage
to allow the derivative action to proceed.
It is not at all clear that Vine provides a justification for concluding
that the purchaser-seller limitation has been even seriously challenged.
The court there very pointedly avoided overruling Birnbaum. The
reasoning with respect to Brod is nearly as tenuous. Since Brod had
condemned an undisclosed scheme to breach state contract law, Judge
Bonsal concluded that "an undisclosed scheme to breach State corporate
fiduciary law must also be covered." 44 He felt bound to view rule lOb-5
as requiring not "deception," but merely an undisclosed breach of
38 [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH F Y). SEc. L. REP. 91,886 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
39 See O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964), holding that a breach of general
fiduciary duties, not involving deception, does not give rise to a cause of action under rule
10b-5.
40 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); see 1967 Dura L.J. 894.
41 875 F.2d at 396 (quoting Judge Bonsai).
42 Id. at 397 (emphasis in original).
48 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
44 270 F. Supp. at 70.
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fiduciary duty. Brod, however, did involve "deception," albeit in a
rather novel form.
Entel v. Allen arguably stands for two propositions. First, share-
holders who neither purchase nor sell in the allegedly fraudulent trans-
action are entitled to damages under rule lOb-5 when corporate insiders
withhold material information in order to gain shareholder approval
of a securities transaction that is against the best interests of the corpora-
tion. This is more than a breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation and
its shareholders; the shareholders have been lulled into a false sense
of security by the silence of the directors and officers, and the vehicle for
the maneuver has been a securities transaction. The proposition is
questionable, however, in view of Birnbaum, which apparently remains
intact despite the decision in Vine.
Second, a derivative action may be brought under lOb-5 without
an allegation that the corporation was "deceived." This assertion is
directly in conflict with O'Neill. The result, however, is in accord with
much of the criticism that has been leveled at O'Neill. When the entire
board of directors acts in concert to harm the corporation, the need
for protection seems greater than when a majority of the directors de-
ceives the minority.45 In the former situation, deception of the share-
holders should be sufficient to allow an action on behalf of the corpora-
tion.
46
45 The latter situation gave rise to a cause of action in Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp.,
339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964). The apparent distinction between Ruckle and O'Neill, viz.;
that when some members of the board deceive others there is a cause of action, but
when all the members act in concert there is none has recently prompted one circuit judge
to remark:
The only possible material difference I can perceive between Ruckle and O'Neill
is that in Ruckle there were directors who were not participants in the trans-
action and thus could be deceived in the ordinary sense. In either case, however,
the failure of the defendant directors to perform their duty presumably injured
the corporation, and I do not believe it is sound to differentiate between situations
where the directors were unanimous in wrongdoing and those where less than all
were involved.
Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 270 (7th Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert. de-
nied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); see Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment,
78 HARv. L. REv. 1146, 1160-67 (1965) (pointing out that the motives of the entire board
of directors, if disclosed, might prompt a derivative suit to block a proposed transaction);
Comment, Securities Regulation: Shareholder Derivative Actions Against Insiders Under
Rule lOb-5, 1966 DuKE LJ. 166, 186, where the author states:
[W]here the control of exploiting insiders over the corporate mechanism they
employ approaches the absolute, as in O'Neill, the necessity for the usual type of
fraudulent practice decreases. Correlatively, there is an increase in the vulner-
ability of the minority segment whose protection is the justification for applying
rule lOb-5 at all.
46 Since O'Neill was decided there has been some support for this result at the district
court level, particularly when a shareholder vote was necessary to accomplish the trans-
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IV
THE PURCHASER-SELLER LIMITATION IN THE
INJUNCTION ACTION
Although the purchaser-seller requirement was born in an action
for an accounting, it has been used occasionally to deny standing to
plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief. Courts have imposed the require-
ment with little or no discussion of the underlying reasons, suggesting
that its application to injunctions is no more than a mechanical re-
sponse conditioned by Birnbaum. Recent decisions, however, have
accorded less weight to the limitation, concentrating on the equitable
and policy considerations involved.
Ruckle v. Roto American Corp.,47 one of the earlier cases, consid-
ered whether a shareholder of a corporation, allegedly fraudulently
induced by some of its directors to authorize issuance of treasury stock
to its president, could maintain a derivative action to enjoin the issu-
ance. Without considering whether the corporation's lack of "seller"
status (the issuance had not yet been consummated) would bar an ac-
tion, the court granted the injunction. The corporation seems to have
been a "constructive seller" and probably satisfied the purchaser-seller
requirement in light of subsequent decisions in Vine and Dasho. Ruckle
nevertheless supports the proposition that the Birnbaum limitation
will not apply when an injunction is sought against a fraudulently in-
duced corporate securities transaction. Thus under the Ruckle ra-
tionale, a fraudulently authorized redemption of stock or an exchange
of shares pursuant to a merger are possible situations in which Birn-
baum will not block an injunction. The utility of Ruckle becomes
action in question. Thus, a derivative action has withstood a motion to dismiss where
stockholder approval of a corporate acquisition was allegedly obtained by the use of proxy
statements known by the directors to be false and misleading. Simon v. New Haven Board
8. Carton Co., 250 F. Supp. 297 (D. Conn. 1966). More recently, a similar action was al-
lowed to proceed where a stock option agreement was allegedly approved through the
use of misleading information accompanying proxy materials. The defendants argued
that there had been no deception at the corporate level in contrast to Ruckle, but the
court replied:
[T]he distinction is at best superficial.... In both situations, the corporation is
alleged to have been "deceived" in the only sense in which a fictional legal person
can be deceived, i.e., through deception practiced upon those real persons through
whom it acts.
Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 266 F. Supp. 524, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (footnotes omitted). Where,
however, there is no allegation of deception at the corporate level, as where all the di-
rectors were aware of the material facts, and, in addition, there was no need for share-
holder approval, O'Neill apparently still controls. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp.
385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
47 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
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more conjectural, however, when the party on whose behalf the in-
junction is sought is not an expected party to the transaction. Ruckle
probably fails to reach the facts of Birnbaum since the corporation
there was not a party to the sale of control.
Other cases demonstrate that the limitation does in fact have
greater force when the plaintiff is a stranger to the alleged fraud. In
Studebaker v. Allied Products Corp.,48 the plaintiff corporation alleged
that defendant outsiders, following an unsuccessful merger attempt,
were seeking to gain control of plaintiff and had made false representa-
tions that caused a distortion in the price of its stock, in violation of
sections 9(a)49 and 10(b). The suit to enjoin the alleged manipulations
was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff, not a purchaser or seller,
was not entitled to maintain a private action. On appeal to the Sixth
Circuit, the argument was made that an issuer of stock has a duty to
prevent manipulations of its stock. Settlement was reached before a
decision was handed down. 50
Appellants in Allied Products argued that J.I. Case Co. v. Borak5l
and Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin52 allow a corporation to enjoin viola-
tions of section 10(b). In Borak the Supreme Court held that private
suits were permissible to remedy violations of section 14 (a) and the
proxy rules, stating that "[p]rivate enforcement of the proxy rules pro-
vides a necessary supplement to Commission action."' 83 The Second
Circuit followed this broad policy in Gittlin by upholding an injunc-
tion prohibiting the use of shareholder authorizationslobtained by
solicitations made in violation of section 14(a).
The argument that, if a corporation is permitted to enjoin a viola-
tion of the proxy rules, it should also be entitled to enjoin violations of
rule lOb-5 was accepted in Moore v. Greatamerica Corp.15 The court
rested its decision squarely on the rationale of Borak and Gittlin and
decided that an injunction could legitimately be granted to a non-
purchaser or non-seller against a tender offeror who had made mis-
leading statements in conjunction with the offer.55
48 256 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich. 1966), appeal dismissed, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1966,
at 27, col. 3.
49 48 Stat. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.c. § 78i(a) (1964).
50 N.Y.Times, Dec. 31, 1966, at 27, col. 3. There is an enlightening discussion of the
case, including a review of the arguments urged on the abortive appeal, in Comment,
Private Enforcement Under Rule 10b-5: An Injunction for a Corporate Issuer?, 115 U. PA.
L. RFv. 618 (1967).
51 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
52 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966).
53 377 U.S. at 432.
54 274 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Ohio 1967). See 81 HARv. L. RPv. 501 (1967).
55 274 F. Supp. at 492. Cf. Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 383
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In Pacific Insurance Co. v. Blot,5 6 the plaintiff corporation sought
to enjoin the defendant's use of shares, which were allegedly acquired
through violations of section 10(b), to compel disclosure of its share-
holder lists. The court noted that the case had a strong procedural
similarity to Gittlin, but denied standing because the plaintiff was not
a party to the alleged transactions and thus had not been defrauded or
damaged. Gittlin was distinguished on the ground that the court there
had found that "impairment of corporate suffrage by itself was a
sufficient injury." 5, This reasoning suggests that it was unnecessary for
the court to use the purchaser-seller limitation to buttress its opinion,
since it could have denied the injunction solely on traditional
equitable principles. There is, of course, a significant difference be-
tween a holding that the plaintiff has no standing to sue and one that it
is not entitled to the relief sought.
Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.5" presented the purchaser-
seller requirement in the context of an action for damages and an
injunction. Defendant Genesco, by means of private purchases and a
tender offer, acquired control of S.H. Kress &c Co., allegedly intending
to use Kress's undervalued real estate to finance the acquisition and to
appropriate Kress's assets for its own benefit. The plaintiffs bought
Kress stock after the tender offer terminated. They claimed that after
their purchase the defendants manipulated the price of Kress's stock
to encourage the minority shareholders to sell at depressed prices.59 The
plaintiffs sought a direct pro rata payment for the misused assets, liqui
dation of Kress, and an injunction prohibiting further manipulation of
the stock.
The court dismissed the damage claims, holding that the alleged
fraud prior to plaintiff's purchase was outside the ambit of rule lOb-5.
At best plaintiffs could claim that in gaining control of Kress, through
a tender offer to which plaintiffs were not parties, defendants had
failed to disclose their intentions to misuse the corporate assets. The
court accepted the SEC's argument that to allow this action would "con-
vert any instance of corporate mismanagement into a Rule lob-5 case." 60
This holding illuminates one of the outer limits of the lOb-5 phrase
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." The alleged
F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1967), in which an injunction against a tender offer was not granted
where there was no showing that the alleged misrepresentations were material or that
irreparable injury would result. The court assumed without deciding that plaintiffs had
standing.
56 267 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
57 Id. at 957.
58 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
519 Id. at 542.
60 Id. at 545.
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deception took place before the plaintiffs became shareholders and was
directed at a class of persons of which plaintiffs were not members; cer-
tainly a buyer has no cause of action when there is no proximate causal
relation between the deception and the alleged injury. However, al-
though the plaintiffs were neither purchasers nor sellers in relation to
the market manipulations subsequent to their purchase, the court
granted the injunction, stating:
[W]e do not regard the fact that plaintiffs have not sold their stock
as controlling on the claim for injunctive relief. The complaint al-
leges a manipulative scheme which is still continuing. While doubt-
less the Commission could seek to halt such practices, present
stockholders are also logical plaintiffs to play "an important role
in enforcement" of the Act in this way .... Deceitful manipulation
of the market price of publicly-owned stock is precisely one of the
types of injury to investors at which the Act and the Rule were
aimed. . . . [A]s already indicated, the claim for damages . . .
founders both on proof of loss and the causal connection with the
alleged violation of the Rule; on the other hand, the claim for in-
junctive relief largely avoids these issues, may cure harm suffered
by continuing shareholders and would afford complete relief
against the Rule 10b-5 violation for the future.61
This decision indicates an intent to apply the rationale developed
in the cases involving the proxy rules to shareholders seeking to enjoin
violations of rule lOb-5.62 The decision, however, has no apparent effect
on damage actions.
The position of the Second Circuit is healthy, because it will result
in a fairer and less arbitrary application of rule lOb-5. The court has
recognized that whether the plaintiff is a purchaser or seller is irrelevant
to a prayer for injunctive relief. The key issues are whether there is a
potential violation of rule lOb-5 and whether the violation threatens
harm to the plaintiff. If these elements are present, there is no sound
reason to deny a federally-created cause of action, with its attendant
procedural advantages, to both corporations and individuals.
V
THE FUTURE OF THE PURCHASER-SELLER LIMITATION
The purchaser-seller limitation created in Birnbaum has come
under increasing attack. The requirement has been almost entirely
eliminated from injunction cases, and its continuing vitality in damage
61 Id. at 546-47 (citations omitted).
62 Despite the decision, at least one later case denying a request for injunctive relief
for an alleged violation of rule lob-5 has been based partially on the purchaser-seller
limitation, Colonial Realty Corp. v. Curtis Publishing Co., [Current Vol.] CCHI FED. S EC.
L. REP. 92,105 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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actions is at least questionable. Are there persuasive reasons for retain-
ing the requirement either in whole or in part?
Neither the statute nor rule lOb-5 requires such a restriction; each
merely defines the area of unlawful conduct. The private civil action
and the limitations thereon are solely creatures of judicial interpreta-
tion.63 The Supreme Court has given implicit sanction to the private
remedy,64 and arguably no arbitrary bar such as the purchaser-seller
requirement ought to exist. The courts should instead decide whether
there is conduct prohibited by rule 1Ob-5 and whether it has caused the
damages claimed.
A simple example illustrates the dilemma that Birnbaum creates
for potential plaintiffs. The directors of X Corporation, desiring to
force shareholders to sell out, drive the market price of the stock down
by cutting dividends and issuing falsely pessimistic reports of the cor-
poration's prospects. If a shareholder, S, does in fact sell out in response
to this scheme, he can probably bring a lob-5 action for damages.6 5 But
he may have sensible reasons for not wishing to sell his stock. At least
in the Second Circuit, S is free to seek an injunction against further
manipulation. Injunctive relief will minimize future losses, and the
market price of the stock may well recover the lost ground. If he should
decide to bring a damage action, however, Birnbaum probably stands
in his path.66
Some may argue that there is no point in allowing S to seek dam-
ages, since he, as opposed to his counterpart who has sold his stock at
the depressed price, has suffered only paper losses. It is not, however,
always true that S's losses are only "paper." Any significant drop in the
market price of the stock impairs its value to S as collateral, and he may
be denied business opportunities otherwise available to him. Further-
more, if S has purchased the stock on margin, he may be forced to put
up additional capital to avoid foreclosure. Under ordinary circum-
stances this additional capital would be available to produce indepen-
dent income.
63 See Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-1OB-5: An Emerging Remedy for De-
frauded Investors, 59 YAL L.J. 1120 (1950); cf. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5:
Judicial Revisions of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963), in which the
author argues that it was not the intent of Congress to create a civil liability under § 10(b).
64 See p. 685 & note 7 supra.
65 Cf. Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
66 See also Greenstein v. Paul, [1966-67 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. Rr.
92,011 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), where the district court granted summary judgment to defend-
ants in precisely this type of action. The court distinguished Mutual Shares Corp. v.
Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967), as involving a request for injunctive relief
rather than damages, and applied the Birnbaum rule. The issue posed in the text was
briefly discussed by the court in Mutual Shares, 384 F.2d at 546, but does not appear to
have received full consideration.
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Some might further argue that the speculative nature of S's dam-
ages will usually preclude recovery. This should not, however, bar his
cause of action. Since S's damages might not be speculative, the issue
should be determined upon proof at trial rather than upon the plead-
ings.67
A comparison of S's position with that of the plaintiff in Vine
further emphasizes the arbitrary effect of Birnbaum. Apart from the
technicality that S is not a "seller" by virtue of his corporation's having
ceased to exist, his situation is strikingly similar to that of the plaintiff
in Vine.
The fraud involved has certainly been the type of manipulation
the Securities Exchange Act was meant to curb. Moreover, the fraudu-
lent misrepresentations were aimed at a class of persons of which plain-
tiff was a member. Finally, under the Vine rationale plaintiff is not
required to show his reliance if he is a member of a class, some of whose
members have relied on the misrepresentations or nondisclosures of
material facts by insiders. To allow the plaintiff in Vine but not S to
proceed to trial is difficult to justify.
The complete abolition of the Birnbaum requirement would not
only eliminate an unwarranted bias against one class of plaintiffs but
also would have a salutary effect on lOb-5 litigation by forcing courts
to rule on the sufficiency of a greater number of claims and thereby
further define the limits of rule lOb-5. A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow68
demonstrates that the rule can find novel application, and, in the ab-
sence of more specific legislation, this is probably desirable.
The fear is frequently voiced that any judicial expansion of the
scope of the lOb-5 action is a further step in the development of a
federal corporation law and amounts to legislative action better left to
Congress.60 The requirement remains, however, that there must be
some form of deception to bring an action under lOb-5. The "breach
of fiduciary duty" to corporations and their shareholders, without some
element of deception, remains exclusively within the province of state
law. The removal of the purchaser-seller limitation would not add to
the activities that are actionable under rule lOb-5, but would merely
increase the number of potential plaintiffs who could recover for in-
juries caused by those activities.
Henry P. Massey, Jr.
67 Cf. Defiance Indus., Inc. v. Galdi, 256 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), in which a cor-
poration brought suit for damages allegedly sustained when defendants manipulated its
stock on the American Stock Exchange. The action was dismissed because the corporation
had not traded in the stock and the only losses involved were those of its shareholders.
08 375 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1967).
69 See, e.g., Judge Bonsal in Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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